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I. Introduction
The decline of real and relative earnings among younger workers, particularly among males under 35, has been well documented, both for Canada (Morissette, Myles and Picot, 1994; Betcherman and Morissette, 1994) and for other industrialized countries (Davis, 1992) . This decline has a substantial history, first starting in the late 1970s (Myles, Picot and Wannell, 1988) , it has been observed across all educational levels (Beaudry and Green, 1997) . Longitudinal studies are suggesting that the earnings decline is persistent in the sense that as a young cohort ages, their age earnings profile remains below that of earlier cohorts (Morissette, 1997; Beaudry and Green, 1997) .
Among young women the decline in real earnings has been less noticeable, and declines observed during recessions are usually recaptured during expansions, resulting in little overall structural decline in earnings. However, older women have experienced a much more rapid increase in earnings than their younger counterparts. Thus, while there has been little real decline in earnings among young women, their relative earnings (relative to older female workers) have fallen substantially, as documented in a number of the papers noted above. Hence, the gap in both hourly wages and annual earnings between younger and older workers has increased over the past twenty years for both men and women.
While a number of papers have documented these stylized facts, there has been relatively little work attempting to explain the increasing wage gap by age. Davis (1992) argued that the experience premium associated with older workers may have been increasingly important in a world of rising technological change. Morissette, Myles and Picot (1994) argued that other factors may be at play, including the reluctance of firms to decrease the wages of experienced workers because of the effect on productivity and morale, resulting in the traditional downward stickiness of wages for most workers. There is little empirical evidence to support (or reject) either of these views at this time. This paper focuses on another possible explanation for the increasing earnings gap between younger and older workers: the changing relative educational attainment levels of younger and older workers. Traditionally younger workers enjoyed an education premium over their older counterparts. While older workers benefited from greater experience, younger workers benefited from higher educational levels. These factors clearly influence relative earnings levels, as experience and education are highly correlated with earnings. In the more recent past however, the relative education premium enjoyed by younger workers has largely disappeared. In the mid1990s the educational attainment of older workers is roughly comparable to that of their younger counterparts, for males at least. The relative decline in educational attainment among the young over the 1981-1995 period, relative to older workers, would result in a relative decline in earnings.
Using a regression decomposition approach, we find that, during the 1980s, the growth in the relative educational attainment of older workers has contributed to about one-quarter of the increase in the age-wage gap of men and women. During the 1990s, the age-wage gap increased to a much lesser extent. Changing relative educational attainment accounted for a much greater proportion of the much smaller increase in the gap: almost one-half for males and over threequarters for women.
The second objective of the paper relates to the expected real wages. While the educational attainment of younger male workers has been rising over the 1981-95 period, their real hourly wages and annual earnings have been falling. This suggests that the real expected wages for workers with any given level of education, including a university degree, may have been falling. What of older workers and younger women, has the expected wage associated with any particular level of education been falling? Using a wage equation that controls for changes in other characteristics such as industry of employment, full-time part-time status and region, we find that during the 1980s the expected weekly wages associated with all levels of education fell for younger workers, both for men and women (from 2% to 16%, depending upon education level). Older employees, on the other hand, experienced mixed results. Expected weekly wages rose for some older workers and fell for some others.
The story is somewhat different for the 1990s. Different patterns are observed not so much between younger and older workers but rather between men and women. Young male workers continued to experience a decline in expected wages, regardless of their education level, and older male workers shared in this decline. However, most young women saw their expected wages rise, as did most older women. The only exception was university educated women, who experienced a decline in expected wages during the early 1990s.
II. The Data
Two sets of data are employed in this research. We use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to examine weekly earnings over the 1981-95 period. The SCF provides a consistent time series on earnings over this period. Unfortunately, the education variable underwent significant changes in 1989, making results for different educational groups before and after that year not comparable. For this reason, the analysis based on SCF is carried out for two periods: 1981-88 and 1989-1995 . These are reasonable time periods, as the former roughly approximates the peak to peak period of the 1980s business cycle. The latter documents changes between the last business cycle peak (1989) and the most recent data, which is well into the 1990s recovery. When we use SCF data, our sample consists of workers with positive weekly earnings and no self-employment income.
We also use the Survey of Work History (SWH) of 1981 and the Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS) of 1988 to examine both weekly earnings and hourly wages over the 1981-1988 period. Data on hourly wages are not available on a reliable basis from the SCF. The sample selected for these surveys consists of jobs held in December by paid workers.
To keep the comparisons tractable, we restrict our attention to two age groups: individuals aged 25-34 and those aged 45-54. We exclude workers aged 18-24 to sidestep problems associated with shifting patterns over time in the rates of school attendance and part-time employment. Also, at any point in time a significant proportion of 18-24 year olds are still in school, decreasing the proportion who are strongly attached to the labour market, our primary group of interest. Individuals aged 45-54 are selected because changing patterns of early retirements among the 55-64 year old population may also influence the results by changing the composition of the workers in the sample over time.
III. The Wage Gap Between Younger and Older Workers, 1981-1995
The evolution of wages of individuals aged 25-34 and of those aged 45-54 is shown in Table 1 . Whatever wage measure is used and whatever period is considered, all data sets indicate that older men and women improved their position relative to their younger counterparts over the last fifteen years.
The SCF data suggest that the gap in weekly earnings between young and older men rose from 18% to 30% between 1981 and 1988 and continued to grow in the 1990s. The SWH-LMAS data also show an increase in the wage differential, although the magnitude of the increase differs IURP 6&) $FFRUGLQJ WR 6:+/0$6 WKH ZDJH JDS EHWZHHQ \RXQJ DQG ROGHU PHQ GHILQHG ERWK LQ WHUPV RI ZHHNO\ ZDJHV DQG KRXUO\ ZDJHV URVH IURP WR EHWZHHQ DQG 1988.
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In 1981, older women earned on average less than their younger counterparts. This is likely because a larger proportion of women in the older age bracket worked part-time 2 . The younger cohort also had significantly higher levels of education in 1981 than their older counterparts (Table 2 ). According to SCF data on weekly earnings, older women earned 7% less than young women in 1981 but then earned 5% more in 1988. The wage premium grew further in 1995.
3 In contrast, the SWH-LMAS data show that older women earned 7-9% less than young women in 1981 and 2-3% less in 1988.
The growth of the relative wages of older workers has been associated with a substantial increase in their relative educational attainment. In 1981, 21% of older males and 32% of young males had post-secondary education or more (Table 2) . By 1988, the difference had been reduced: the corresponding figures were 30% and 36%. Although the numbers for the 1989-1995 period cannot be compared to those of the 1981-1988 period for the reasons mentioned above it is obvious that this pattern continued in the 1990s. In 1989, 40% of older males and 46% of young males had post-secondary education or more: in 1995, the corresponding numbers were 51% and 54%.
A slightly different pattern is observed among women. Between 1981 and 1988 , the relative educational attainment measured by the percentage of women with at least post-secondary education of older women rose substantially. However, there was little change in the relative educational attainment of the younger and older women between 1989 and 1995.
This declining gap is likely due to the rapid increase in the post-secondary participation rate during the 1960s and early 1970s. While the post-secondary participation rate continued to rise during the 1980s and early 1990s, the increase was not as dramatic as during the 1960s and early
The SWH-LMAS data suggest that most of the increase in the weekly wage gap came from an increase (16%) in the real weekly wages of men aged 45-54. In contrast, the SCF data suggests that the drop in real weekly wages of men aged 25-34 (-7%) is the dominant factor. 1970s. The cohort that was college age in the 1960s received a much higher level of education than their predecessors. As they aged, they raised the educational level of each age group as they passed through it. Upon reaching the 45-54 year old age group, they increased its educational attainment dramatically. Among men, the age disparity in educational levels was almost eliminated, and among women, it was reduced significantly. Continuing education and the receipt of degree and diplomas later in life may also have contributed to this narrowing educational gap.
IV. Decomposition of the Growth in the Wage Gap
In this section, we seek to determine the extent to which the improvement in the relative educational attainment of older workers accounts for the growth in their relative wages. To do so, we use a regression decomposition technique. This allows us to decompose the change in the wage gap between young and older workers into two components: 1) changes in the characteristics of the workers employed in the two age groups and, 2) changes in the expected returns to these characteristics.
Consider the case where the decomposition is applied to the 1981-1988 Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) , the difference in mean log earnings between 1981 and 1988 for workers of age group j can be expressed as:
The first component on the right of (2) is the part of the growth in earnings of a given age group attributable to changes over time in the mean characteristics of this particular age group. The second component is the part due to differences in the returns to these characteristics as well as differences in the constant terms 4 . Applying (2) to both age groups, the difference between the growth rate of earnings of older workers (r) and the growth rate of earnings of young workers (g) can be expressed as follows: 4 The reader familiar with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition will have noted that ( ) 1 
The component on the second line of (3) is the change in the earnings gap due to changes in relative mean characteristics across age groups (i.e. relative changes in the composition of the population), weighted at group-specific 1988 prices. It is this component which allows us to measure the degree to which the growth in the relative educational attainment of older workers accounts for the growth in the age earnings gap. The second component, defined on the third line of (3), is the change due to variation in the relative returns to these characteristics across age groups, weighted by group-specific 1981 means of the explanatory variables.
The decomposition associated with equation (3) is performed for men and women separately and for the two following periods : 1981-1988 and 1989-1995 . We first report the results based on SCF data and then follow with the findings obtained from SWH-LMAS.
IV.1 Results Based on SCF Data
The wage gap between young and older men increased by 0.125 log points between 1981 and 1988 (Table 3) . During this period, the growth in the level of education of both young and older males increased the mean (log) weekly earnings by .011 among the young, and .041 among older workers. Thus, the growth in the relative educational attainment of older workers explains 24% (i.e. 0.030/0.125) of the growth in the age-wage gap. Changes in the composition of workers among the other factors (region of employment, industry and full-time/part-time status) had only a marginal effect on the relative wage gap. Changes in the fraction of workers employed parttime decreased the weekly earnings of young males while increasing those of older workers. This factor accounted for 9% of the increase in the wage gap. It may reflect the growing problems young workers face in the labour market. Taken together, compositional changes accounted for 30% of the growth of the wage gap. The remaining 70% is due to changes in the relative returns to characteristics.
Between 1989 and 1995, the age-wage gap grew more moderately (.062) but the changes in the composition of employment by education accounted for a bigger portion of the rise in the gap (45%). This was due to a very rapid increase in the educational attainment of the older workers, which tended to increase their average wages by 5%. A similar pattern, though more moderate, is observed for younger workers. The change in full-time/part-time status played a more significant role during this period, accounting for one-quarter of the wage gap. In this case there was a deterioration among both younger and older workers (i.e. a growing tendency to work part-time in both groups), but much more so among younger workers. Overall, compositional changes in all factors accounted for roughly 75% of the change in the wage gap. Changes in expected returns to specific characteristics accounted for the remaining one-quarter.
The results for women for the 1981-1988 period are very similar to those for men. The age-wage gap virtually increased by the same amount for women (0.126) as it did for men (Table 4) . Changes in the distribution of employment by education and changes in the relative propensity to 
work part-time accounted for 28% and 11% of the growth in the wage gap, respectively. Globally, compositional changes accounted for 39% of the rising gap.
Likewise, the increase in the age-wage gap among women was much smaller between 1989 and 1995 (0.034). Changes in relative educational attainment account for 87% of the rising gap during this period. This is a little misleading, as compositional effects account altogether for more than the total increase in the wage gap. This is so simply because the expected relative returns to the characteristics considered in our wage equation changed such as to favour younger, QRW ROGHU ZRPHQ 2WKHU WKLQJV HTXDO WKLV WHQGHG WR UHGXFH UDWKHU WKDQ LQFUHDVH WKH ZDJH JDS
IV.2 Results Based on SWH-LMAS
The results for the 1980s were replicated using data on both hourly and weekly wages from the 1981 Survey of Work History, and the 1988 Labour Market Activity Survey. The wage gap by age increases for both men and women, but more for the former than latter ( Table 5 ). The changing relative educational composition of younger and older workers accounts for from 21% to 23% of the rising wage gap for both men and women, whether using hourly or weekly wages. These are similar to the values reported above. Not surprisingly, the shift in relative parttime/full-time (ft/pt) status plays a larger role when the gap is described in terms of weekly, rather than hourly wages. Changes in relative hours worked per week are more likely to play a role in changing relative weekly wages than relative hourly wages.
Changes in the relative importance of part-time jobs accounted for 9% of the rising weekly wage gap for males, and 38% for women. This latter result is significantly stronger than that observed in the SCF data for women. Finally, shifts in changes in relative industry of employment are also seen to be significant in accounting for the rising weekly wage gap for women in these data (accounting for 33% of the increase). This was not the case in the SCF-based results for the 1980s, where industry shifts were seen to be insignificant.
Depending on the data sets and wage measures used, the growth in the relative educational attainment of older men and women accounts for 21% to 28% of the growth in the age-wage gap observed during the 1981-1988 period (Table 6 ). For men, SCF and SWH-LMAS suggest that compositional effects explain 24%-35% of the increase in the wage gap during this period. The relative importance of such effects is less clear for women: changes in the composition of employment accounts for about one-quarter of the rising weekly wage gap based on the SCF data, and 91% based on the SWH/LMAS data. The latter results stems from the increased importance of relative shifts in industry and ft/pt status in the special survey data.
V. Expected Wages Across All Educational Levels
So far, the focus of the paper has been on changes in relative wages between young and older workers, and the extent to which these changes can be accounted for by changes in relative levels of education, or changes in relative returns to worker or job characteristics. In this section, we ask whether the expected wage for any given level of education has changed over the 1980s and early 1990s. If so, have similar changes occurred for both younger and older workers? * − , will capture changes in the returns to education as well as changes in the returns to other characteristics. The exponential of the log wage is taken to convert it to wage levels.
V.1 Results for Men
The expected wages of young men dropped during both periods, and for all levels of educational attainment. Having a higher level of education did not protect young males from getting lower wages. This is consistent with the findings of Beaudry and Green (1997) . During the 1980s the decline in weekly earnings was between 7% and 16%, depending upon the level of education (Table 8 ). There was no consistent trend by level of education. During the first half of the 1990s the drop was from 1% to 16%. For both periods, the largest decline occurred both among university graduates and individuals with elementary schooling. Thus, the decline was not necessarily smaller for highly educated workers.
Older males also saw their expected weekly earnings fall across all levels of education during the early 1990s. The magnitude of the decline was roughly comparable to that for younger male workers: it ranged from 0.2% to 16%, depending upon the education level. In fact, the decline of wages of all older men with at least grade 9 is not statistically different from that of older men with less than grade 9 (11%). During the 1980s, there was not a consistent decline among all levels of education.
In sum, younger and older male workers were hit equally hard during the 1990s, but older workers (with a given level of education) did not experience the magnitude of the decline of younger workers during the 1980s.
V.2 Results for Women
The results for women are somewhat different. Young women saw their weekly earnings fall across all levels of education during the 1980s: the drop varied between 2% and 9% (Table 9 ).
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The decline was not as great as among young men, however. During the first half of the 1990s, weekly earnings of young women rose in almost all educational levels, contrary to those of young males. The only exception is with young female university graduates, whose expected weekly earnings fell slightly.
Older women witnessed an increase in weekly wages in many education levels, especially during the 1990s (Table 9) . During the 1980s, their wage growth was not monotonically increasing with education. During the 1990s, only older women with a university degree experienced a significant decline in expected earnings; those fell by 16%.
The overall results are as follows. Young men in all educational levels experienced a decline in expected weekly earnings during both periods. Older men experienced a decline in the 1990s in particular. Young women in all educational levels experienced a decline in the 1980s, but this decline was less substantial than for their male counterparts. During the 1990s, most young and older women saw their expected weekly earnings rise. University graduates were the exception: both young and older women with a university degree saw their expected real weekly earnings fall in the 1990s. In general, women experienced smaller declines or more substantial increases that their male counterparts. It is important to recognize that the results are based on weekly earnings, and these can be influenced by both changes in hourly wages and weekly hours worked.
There have been significant changes in weekly hours worked over both the 1980s and early 1990s, particularly among women (Sheridan, Diverty and Sunter, 1996) .
The decline in wages of young women with more than elementary schooling is not statistically different (at the 5% level) from that of young women with only elementary schooling.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has shown that differences in the growth of educational attainment explain one fourth to one third of the growth in the wage gap between young and older workers. The second main finding of this paper is that, whatever data sets are used, substantial drops in real wages took place among young male workers in virtually all education levels.
In a supply and demand framework, the decline in youth real wages must originate from a combination of increases in their relative labour supply and/or decreases in their relative labour demand. Davis (1992) suggested that since the decline in youth real wages took place in several countries with divergent labour market institutions, the cause of the decline should lie with a common factor such as skill-biased technological change. Since then, while numerous studies have attempted to explain the growth in the college-high school wage premium (Allen, 1996; Bartel and Sicherman, 1997; Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1997) in the United States, little has been learned about the factors which caused the age-wage gap to widen.
Two pieces of evidence cast doubt on skill-biased technological change as an explanation for the decline of youth real wages. First, industry-specific measures of technological change show no correlation with changes in the returns to experience in the United States (Allen, 1996) . Second, in Canada, the decline in youth real wages is associated with a downward shift of the ageearnings profiles of the recent cohorts of young workers (Beaudry and Green, 1997; Morissette, 1997) . In these last two studies, there is no evidence that the returns to experience of specific cohorts have increased, as the skill-biased technical change hypothesis would imply. Rather, the growth of the age-wage gap appears to result from a deterioration of the earnings prospects of recent cohorts.
What factors other than skill-biased technical change can then explain the worldwide drop in young workers' real wages? One obvious candidate is the growth in female labour force participation. As long as it is observed in many OECD countries and as long as new female entrants are substitutes for inexperienced workers, the growth of women's labour force participation could induce downward pressures on the real wages of young workers. A second explanation, which may prove difficult to test, relies on self-selection effects. In many OECD countries, there has been a substantial increase in school enrollment. If the growth in school enrollment takes place in a non-random way and, more precisely, if young individuals who choose to stay longer in school have more abilities than those who are observed in the labour market, then self-selection of better individuals into school may explain part of the drop in youth
UHDO ZDJHV 7R WKH H[WHQW WKDW UHDO ZDJHV IHOO DPRQJ LQGLYLGXDOV DJHG IRU ZKLFK WKH DIRUHPHQWLRQHG VHOIVHOHFWLRQ SURFHVV LV OHVV SURQRXQFHG DV ZHOO DV DPRQJ LQGLYLGXDOV DJHG
24, it is not clear, a priori, how far one can go with the self-selection explanation.
Other explanations will have to rely on labour market institutions of various countries. In Canada, while the aggregate unionization rate has remained fairly stable over the last fifteen years, the unionization rate of young workers has dropped substantially. Yet most of the drop in youth real wages remains even after accounting for this decline in unionization (Morissette, 1997) . However, this does not necessarily rule out de-unionization as a potential factor. Combined with a relatively slack Canadian labour market, the decline in unionization may have induced spillover effects, i.e. may have decreased the bargaining power of young workers in unionized as well as non-unionized sectors. Simple standardization procedures cannot take that possibility into account. Because of the tremendous implications it holds for the potential standard of living of the "future adult" Canadian workforce, the widening of the age-wage gap is likely to remain on the research agenda for the near future. * This is the value of the term on the second line of equation (3). ** This is the value of the term on the first line of equation (3). * This is the value of the term on the second line of equation (3). ** This is the value of the term on the first line of equation (3). 
